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ROBERT E NAGEL
Suppose that a state enacted a statute prohibiting jurors
in criminal cases from publishing accounts of their deliberations. Many versions of such a statute are possible.
The restrictions might apply only within a specific time
period (say, until a year after the verdict) and they might
apply only to commercial sales. Probably the statute
would have an exception permitting written or verbal
accounts made in connection with an appeal or new
trial. Let us assume a fairly extreme law -- a permanent
prohibition against any publication except those made
as a part of the judicial process. What is the conventional
legal approach to assessing the kinds of free speech
issues raised by such a statute? How satisfactory is this
approach?
Modern constitutional analysis usually begins with an
apparently inclusive identification of the relevant interests. In this instance, of course, the most important of
these is the First Amendment right to publish. In a legal
world where school students, imprisoned felons, and
corporations all have the right to free speech, the status
of being a juror surely cannot preclude the assertion of
this right. More important than the status of the speaker
is the interest of the public in hearing what the juror has
to say. And, again, in the world of modern legal discourse, the potential significance of information about
jury deliberations in criminal cases cannot be denied.
Remember, the Supreme Court has already held that the
public has a constitutional interest in reading price
advertisements and seeing exotic dancing. Given these
Robert F. Nagel is Moses Lasky Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado, Boulder.

parameters, it is not surprising that the Court has emphatically recognized the public's need to know about
trials. This knowledge is said to be necessary for forming
opinions about the justice system and for assuring a fair
trial process. So crucial is public access to trials that the
privacy of minors who have been the victims of sex
crimes may not be protected by a rule shutting out the
press and the public during their testimony. Moreover,
the privacy interests of potential jurors will not automatically justify closing off voirdire even when the jurors
are being asked about deeply personal matters. Thus,
the public's interest in information about trials extends
not only to sensitive aspects of the trial itself but also to
the jury.
With these starting points, it would certainly be difficult for any court to conclude that the public has no First
Amendment interest in access to information about
what happens inside the jury room. Both the conduct of
the trial and the composition of the jury are to some
extent mere forms that take on operational significance
during the jury's deliberations. What if jurors routinely
disregard the judges' instructions? What if racial discrimination affects discussions? The juror's right to publish,
in short, carries with it the considerable weight of the
general public's interest in information relevant to fair
trials and a wise, effective justice system.
There are, however, other interests that must be identified and "balanced" against the interest in publication.
Under conventional legal analysis, a sufficiently important governmental interest can justify restraints on even
core political speech. Such an interest might be implicated by the statute under consideration here because
the disclosure of details of jury discussions could reduce
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the candor and depth of those discussions. At least, the
Court has already acknowledged this sort of possibility
in the famous case involving President Nixon's confidential conversations. Since many judges, including Supreme Court Justices, hold secret conferences while
deciding cases, the relationship between confidentiality

The legal primacy of the constitutional
interest in free speech encourages
a soft-headed suspension of
disbelief on empirical
and historicalissues.
and candor would seem plausible in the context of judicial proceedings as well. Moreover, the quality of deliberation might lead to income or notoriety. For example,
there might be an incentive to elicit conflict or drama in
the jury room and, since a hung jury might be thought to
be of less potential interest, there might also be an inappropriate incentive to reach unanimity. Courts would
have to carefully itemize these competing interests.
This sort of inclusive consideration of relevant interests
lends a reasonable cast to the Court's current approach to
First Amendment analysis. This impression is strengthened by the second stage of analysis: an effort to balance
and accommodate the various interests. The main consideration at this stage is whether the governmental
interest (in the quality of jury deliberations) could be
achieved in any way that trenched less severely on the
interests involved in publication. Since our hypothetical
statute would bar almost all publication and would do so
for unlimited lengths of time, it would be vulnerable. For
instance, it might be thought that long-delayed publications, which would probably not have been contemplated during the deliberations, need not be prohibited in
order to achieve the state's purpose. This seems a sensible objection, and it leaves open the possibility that a
more finely tailored statute might still be constitutional.
This method -- the full articulation of the relevant interests and a precise, rationalistic effort at accommodation
-- may sound reasonable enough, but I believe it limits
judicial inquiry in important ways.
Notice, first, how the legal primacy of the constitutional interest in free speech encourages a soft-headed
suspension of disbelief on empirical and historical issues.
Why believe that the public has any significant need for
direct accounts of jury deliberations? Conventional con-

stitutional analysis answers this question by naming
some obviously important public issue (for example,
the justice system) and then assuming that almost any
information potentially relevant to that issue, no matter
what its character or source, is needed by the public.'
This is nearly superstitious in its simplicity. It may be
that, even without the revelations of jurors, the public
has plenty of information available to evaluate both
specific trials and the justice system generally. Possible
alternative sources include direct experience in juries
and in other small groups, scientific studies, and information produced at trial or on appeal. Before assuming
that such sources are inadequate, it would be important
to find out the extent to which jurors' accounts have
been unavailable in the past and whether public decision making was in any way retarded as a result. In
some amorphous way, the public can be thought to
"need" to know almost anything. But without refinement and substantiation, this tells us little about the
consequences of policies that restrict the availability of
information. Notice also how the emphasis on rights
and on instrumental efficacy distracts attention from
the issue of civic responsibility. It may be that our
hypothetical statute would prevent some publications
that were not specifically contemplated during jury
deliberations. However, it does not follow that the
statute is broader than necessary to accomplish the
state's purposes. Restraints, even if overbroad when
viewed from a concretely functional perspective, can be
relevant to shaping self-image and role. If jurors' understand that there is a possibility of any subsequent publication, the spirit in which they approach their responsibilities may be affected.

If jurors understandthat there is a
possibility of any subsequent publication,
the spirit in which they approach their
responsibilitiesmay be affected.
We often recognize that a sense of public role and
duty is inculcated by imposing special restraints on the
use of information by those with public obligations.
Lawyers can be disbarred for revealing the confidences
of their clients. Grand jurors are routinely sworn to
secrecy. Even litigants can be punished for publishing
information obtained through the process of pre-trial
discovery. To evaluate such restraints only in terms of
immediate consequences would be to ignore the impor-
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stood implicitly: that during their deliberations jurors
should see themselves, not as political observers or as
policy analysts or as social psychologists or as artists,
but as public trustees performing a specific public task.
Such a conclusion, incorporated in a statute imposing
broad duties of confidentiality on jurors, might or might
not ultimately turn out to be wise. It would entail
uncertain consequences for public debate, but it would
embody an important notion of civic duty and role.
Unfortunately, conventional free speech analysis would
only skim over both the difficulty and seriousness of the
issues posed. Experience is probably the only way to
find out how dangerous or useful such statutes would
be, and experience is what modern constitutional law
curtails.

tance of a consciousness of public status and responsibility.
Much of the ritual surrounding juries has the effect of
communicating the harsh fact that jurors do not act as
individuals or as private citizens. They are sternly lectured by judges who sit high and are clothed in black
robes; they are separated from their families and jobs;
they are housed in motel rooms and transported in
buses with darkened windows. Until recently, such
treatment, along with general civic education, may have
been enough to create a sense of special function so that
jurors did not often or noticeably discuss their official
experiences. It may be that this sense of purpose and
self-restraint isbreaking down. A legislature might come
to the conclusion that statutory prohibitions are necessary to make explicit a lesson that once had been under-

NOTE
1 Those who think that this must be a tendentious characterization of the Court's approach are referred to Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (need for nearby nude dancing);
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 755 (1978) (need for

opinions of corporations); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (need
for price advertisements); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254(1964) (need for defamatory information).

LOREN E. LOMASKY
Actors sell acting, bakers sell bread, chefs sell cuisine,
and so on through the alphabet. America is a land of an
endless parade of sellers transacting with buyers who, in
turn, themselves become sellers. Our legal justice system is no exception: police, lawyers, judges, jailers
trade their services for remuneration. It is not only
capitalists who need apply; anyone is free to sell.
Some, though, would have it otherwise. In the aftermath of the Howard Beach trial, a mini-controversy has
arisen concerning the propriety of jurors receiving payment in exchange for exclusive reports of jury deliberations. The practice develops in a way that generates a
more salable story. One may suspect that lurking behind
such criticism is a general conviction that dispensation
of justice and the profit motive do not mix.
How likely is it that the integrity of jury proceedings
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will be threatened from this direction? I have no way of
knowing -- nor, I suspect, does anyone else. However,
one can hazard a guess based on generally reliable
human propensities. When I do that, I find it more likely
that jury deliberations will be marginally improved by
prospects of barter than that they will be perverted. The
juror who dozes through the trial and subsequent deliberations will find himself not only sleeping away the opportunity to render a fair verdict but also possessing a
smaller stock of precise recollections to offer an acquisitive press. So it is reasonable to suspect that financiallyminded jurors may be especially dutiful in paying attention to trial proceedings and to the arguments that
transpire in the jurors' room. Indeed, they may be induced to take a more active and incisive role in those
deliberations: wouldn't you want to be a hero of your
own story? On balance, then, there seems at the very
least to be no overwhelming probability of trial proceedings being worsened by the introduction of a cash nexus.
That, though, is speculation. I should not want to rest
the case for jurors' liberty to profit from their role on a
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